Few issues in comparative politics have received as much attention as the possible determinants of democracy. Different studies have identified a set of economic, social, cultural, demographic, political-historical, institutional, and spatio-temporal factors as important causes.
Introduction
The recent wave of revolutions and revolutionary attempts in North Africa and the Middle East have not only been important political events, they have also re-sparked old academic debates. The calls for democracy in these countries have made some authors declare Huntington's argument on the incompatibility of Islam and democracy for dead. Others have, particularly in relation with the Tunisian revolution, brushed off Lipset's classic modernization argument, pointing to the relatively high income level and the size of the middle class in that country. Many observers and political scientists have, however, expressed their surprise at calls for democracy in countries such as Yemen and Libya, and questioned the sincerity of such calls and scepticism regarding the future prospects of democratization efforts. This situation is not dissimilar from the surprise and scepticism raised about 20 years earlier when old dictatorships where challenged in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. ?). African countries were, according to prevalent political science theories, never supposed to democratize and particularly not experience consolidation of their democracies, with their low income and education levels, their resource-based economies, their deep ethnic cleavages, their problematic political history with colonial rule, and other characteristics supposedly hostile to democracy. Nevertheless, electoral democracy has survived in many countries on that continent, and there are even signs of gradually improving democratic quality and improved protection of civil liberties (?) . Hence, the political developments in Sub-Saharan Africa, and later in North Africa, have challenged political scientists and their theories of democratization and democratic consolidation.
Indeed, this discrepancy between the empirical implications from prominent political science theories and empirical events should not be surprising to those having scrutinized the statistical literature on the determinants of democracy. The lack of robust results is perhaps the most notable characteristic of this relatively large literature. Strong theoretical claims have been made on the importance of various factors, from income level and income inequality to religion. However, empirical studies often find only weak results that are not robust to changes in model specifications.
This paper attempts to clarify and establish how robust the various determinants of democracy are, and thus contribute to mitigate the existing confusion at the center of the democratization literature.
Literature review
As noted above, the literature on determinants of democracy is large, and points to a vast set of quite different potential explanatory factors. We do not take aim to review the entire literature, but rather focus on some particularly important proposed explanatory factors and debates from the literature.
Economic factors are among the most studied potential determinants of democracy, and a country's level of GDP per capita has received particular focus. ? famously argued that a high GDP per capita increased the probability of a country being democratic, and several later studies corroborated this result (e.g. ????????) . Hence, the notion that "the richer a country is, the more likely it is to be democratic" was for a long time considered relatively well established. However, a possible relationship between democracy and income level may be due to richer countries having a higher probability of democratizing, but also to democracies becoming increasingly more stable than dictatorships as countries get richer. If only the latter effect is present, the relationship between income and probability of being a democracy is only due to the fact that rich democracies survive longer than rich dictatorships. Indeed, ? find that democracy is not related with income because of rich countries being more prone to democratization, but rather because rich democracies are exceptionally stable. 1 This result has been contested by later studies. For example, ? show that the relationship between income and democratization changes when one substitutes the dichotomous ACLP measure, used by Przeworski and Limongi (1997) , with other measures, and Boix and Stokes (2003) find that probability of democratization increases with income, when the sample is extended back into the 19th century, and when one accounts for oil-rich countries.
When it comes oil income and income from other natural resources, there is a large theoretical and empirical literature on how such income may affect political institutions differently than income stemming from other sources (e.g. ???). More specifically, the literature has highlighted the potential existence of a "political resource curse", particularly focusing on the stabilizing effects on dictatorship, and hence reduced probability of democratization, resulting from high natural resource income. This further points to a more nuanced understanding of the roles of high income levels and sustained income growth for democracy.
Indeed, the modernization literature and other contributions point to a set of variables related to economic development (or modernization), other than income level, that may be of particular relevance for democracy. First, as noted by ? a high level of education in the population may increase both citizens' desire and capacity to establish democracy and participate in democratic processes (see also ??). Second, industrialization, with the complementary transformation of a society from an agrarian to a manufacturing and trading one, generates social differentiation. ?
highlighted the important role of the middle class for establishing and stabilizing a democracy. ?, with a somewhat different argument, also points to the importance of the bourgeoisie dominating society, economy and politics for the probability of democratization. ?, on the other hand, argues that industrialization is conducive to democratization, but that this is rather due to the emergence of an organized industrial working-class. ? even argues that the middle class can be detrimental to democratization, drawing on evidence from Latin America. Nevertheless, many contributions to the literature argue that rural, agrarian societies are not as conducive to democracy urban, industrializing ones. Other potentially important 'modernization variables' are related to communications infrastructure, which allows for rapid diffusion of ideas and information across and within borders, perhaps enhancing the prospects democratization (see, e.g. ?)
Also short-term economic developments may impact on a country's regime type. ? find that economic crises increase the probability of regime breakdown in general. Regimes that experienced a decreasing GDP per capita in the previous year were much more likely to fall than those experiencing positive economic growth. This was true for both democracies and dictatorships. However, especially poor democracies were vulnerable to economic crises. Richer democracies, however, are extremely resistant to crises. When it comes to poor and rich dictatorships, there were smaller differences in regime life expectancy; both rich and poor dictatorships are threatened by economic crises. Also other measures of economic performance, and even particular economic policies, may impact on the stability of democratic and autocratic regimes, for example because they may impact on popular grievances directed towards the regime (e.g. ??)
Income inequality may also affect regime change and stability. ? argued that democracy was less tenable in societies with high levels of social conflict, and economic inequality is widely assumed to increase social conflict. Inequality-induced social grievances may lead to demands for revolution and left-wing dictatorship (??). Also, the well-off in unequal societies may particularly fear democracy because of high redistributive costs, and rather favor an elite-controlled authoritarian regime. ? argues that a decrease in economic inequality leads to a higher probability of democratization, since the rich will have less to lose from taxation in relatively equal societies. They will thus more easily agree to the poor's demands without risking a fight. However, a low degree of inequality may also reduce the likelihood of democratization, as the poor are less eager to fight for democracy if they are already relatively well-off and therefore have little to gain economically from democratization. In unequal societies, on the other hand, the poor have much to gain from democratization, and the rich are not able to credibly commit to redistribution in the future under dictatorship (?). Indeed, empirical studies on income inequality and democracy have produced quite mixed results (e.g. ??). The relatively recent study by ? finds no clear effect of inequality on the probability of democratization, but does find evidence indicating that low inequality stabilizes existing democracies.
Also different types of non-economic factors have been put forth as important determinants of democracy. One group of explanations are related to particular values, or other cultural traits, having important impact on democratization and democratic consolidation (e.g. ??). Furthermore, values, attitudes and other cultural variables with proposed implications for the sustainability of democracy are often been linked to factors such as religion and geographic region. ?, for example, argues that Islamic countries are less susceptible to democracy. Some decades ago, Catholicism was argued to reduce the probability of having a democratic regime, especially when compared with the effect of Protestantism (see, e.g. ?). Furthermore, several academics and politicians have argued that so-called "Asian Values", often linked to Confucianism, promotes hierarchical and authoritarian government, and provides bad conditions for democracy (see the discussion in ?). ? also discusses how particular values are conducive to democracy, but this argument points out that values and attitudes are endogenous, and that they are systematically changed by economic development processes. ? and ? find that liberal, freedom-oriented values become more preponderant in richer and more developed societies, and that these values in turn are important determinants of democracy.
The ethnic fractionalization structure of a country may also impact on the country's regime type.
Theoretical and empirical studies indicate that a heterogenous population may make it more difficult to solve various coordination problems that are vital for ensuring efficiency-enhancing public goods provision (??). Furthermore, various types of heterogeneity in the population, among them ethnic, lingustic and religious heterogeneity, may impact on the design of political institutions and regime type (see, e.g. ?). For example, there may be stronger incentives for various groups of citizens to capture and monopolize power if there is a high degree of ethnic heterogeneity (e.g. ?). The size of the population could also affect the probability of democratization and democratic stability.
However, although some arguments point out that democracy could operate more smoothly in smaller communities (e.g. ?), the net effect of population size is quite unclear.
Particular variables related to historical experiences have also been identified as potential determinants of democracy. For example, it has been argued that former British colonies are more likely to be democratic than other former colonies (see e.g. ?, 173-178). Legal structures are strongly correlated with former colonial power, as the type of legal structure in a country often stems from a particular inherited legal tradition, like British Common Law or French Civil Law (?), and legal origin may impact on various institutional aspects (?). The more general point is that politicalhistorical variables are often correlated with present institutional characteristics. Institutions were often formed in a particular historic context, for example the under influence of a colonizing power with particular institutional preferences, and institutions show a great deal of inertia. This implies that the institutional structure of the past often strongly resembles that of the present (e.g.
??
). Hence, one of the potentially most important historical variable when it comes to explaining democracy is a country's past experiences with democracy (see, e.g. ?).
However, also other political-institutional variables, for example related to type of dictatorship that has ruled historically or current constitutional characteristics may impact on probability of democratization or democratic stability (e.g. ????). Furthermore, economic-institutional aspects related to property rights systems and other market-regulating institutions and institutions those affect the control of corruption may impact on probability of transitions to and from democracy (see, e.g. ??). Also more spontaneous, non-institutionalized political processes may impact on regime transitions. Although regime type may also influence various measures of political stability (?), various such measures, like revolutions and politically motivated assassinations, are likely to negatively affect the survival of both democracies and dictatorships quite directly. There is also evidence indicating that the probability of regime survival increases quite a lot as a regime ages (?).
The list of factors above does not exhaust the potential factors those may determine democratization and democratic stability. For example, spill-over effects from neighbors and the specific identity and strength of regional or global powers in a particular region may be relevant for regime stability and change (e.g. ???). More generally, the probability of democratization and the stability of democratic regimes is likely correlated with spatial and temporal factors because of various reasons (e.g. ?).
For the empirical analysis below, we have gathered and classified proposed explanatory variables from the literature on the determinants of democracy. We operate with 15 "concepts" that are identifiable from the review in this section, and each concept includes a set of indicators (85 in total). In accordance with the discussion on structural economic factors, we include Resource curse, Industrialization and Urbanization, Modernization indicators, Health, Education and Income Inequality among our concepts. Also in accordance with the discussion above, we include Economic performance and policy. In order to investigate the discussed cultural and demographic factors, we also include Ethnicity and religion and Population. Furthermore, the review indicated the importance of historical, institutional and political factors. This leads us to include Colonial heritage, Regime type, Institutional characteristics and Political Stability. Finally, we add Region and Time to address spatial and temporal factors potentially affecting regime type.
Classifying regimes
As noted above, important contributions to the literature have provided strong indications that the factors affecting democratization may not be the same as those affecting democratic stability (e.g.
??); a dichotomous measure conveniently allows us to take this into account through simultaneously investigate the robustness of the determinants of democratization and democratic stability by using dynamic probit or logit models. More specifically, to perform the analysis we utilize a dichotomous measure of democracy constructed from the PolityIV index. As illustrated by Figure 1 , showing that the majority of polities are clearly concentrated at the ends of the Polity scale. The bimodal nature of the distribution combined with clear endpoints (-10/10) violates basic assumptions for OLS regression, and provides another justification for dichotomizing the Polity variable and subsequently using probit or logit models. In accordance with other scholars (e.g. ???), we set the bar for being classified as a democracy at a relatively high level, requiring a Polity score of 6 or higher to be considered a democracy. Although the cutoff point is arbitrary and therefore may be critique-worthy (??), the dichotomization has two notable advantages in addition to those mentioned above. First 4 Methodology of sensitivity analysis 2 ? referred to the largest possible set of inferences that can be drawn from a given data set as 'extreme bounds.' The size of these 'extreme bounds' depends on the number of models that can be estimated (i.e., variations in model specifications) within the limits of the data set. These variations must be theoretically consistent and aim to show how minor changes in the list of variables alter the conclusions of estimation. In Bayesian terms, the extreme bounds approach (EBA) suggests that the analyst explores the range of posterior distributions that result from specification changes to the prior distribution of a variable. To credibly identify the range of inferences that may be drawn from a model, a 'global sensitivity analysis' should be applied, 'large numbers of variables should be included, as should different functional forms, different distributions, different serial correlation assumptions, different measurement error processes, etcetera, etcetera' (?, 311). Given the severe computational burden of such an approach, a reasonable compromise is to focus on selected dimensions of the model and regression coefficients in particular.
? used a variant of ?'s EBA to check the sensitivity of cross-country regression estimates on the determinants of economic growth. They were motivated by what they perceived as frequently contradicting empirical linkages between long-run growth rates and a wide array of explanatory variables. The EBA used by Levine and Renelt specifies equations of the following form:
where Y is the dependent variable, I is a set of variables always included in the regression, M is the 'focus' variable (i.e., the one whose behavior we are interested in observing as we change the model specification), and Z is a subset of control variables selected among several potentially significant explanatory variables. They first estimate a model that includes only the I-variables and the focus variable and then estimate regressions for 'all possible combinations of up to three Z-variables and identify the highest and lowest values for the coefficient on the variable of interest, β µ , that cannot be rejected at the 0.05 significance level' (?, 944) . The design tries to reduce multicollinearity problems by restricting the total number of explanatory variables to 'eight or fewer,' choosing a 'small pool of variables from which the extreme bounds procedure selected Z-variables,' and 'excluding variables that, a priori, might measure the same phenomenon' (?, 944-5) . This specification design minimizes the risk of underspecified models while also minimizing the computer power needed to estimate the models, as well as problems associated with multicollinearity. The extreme bounds on the coefficient β µ denote the confidence that we can have in the partial correlation between Y and M. The upper extreme bound is defined as the maximum value of β µ plus two standard deviations, and the lower extreme bound is β µ minus two standard deviations of the estimate. Coefficient β µ is considered robust if it 'remains significant and of the same sign at the extreme bounds' (?, 944).
?, 959's analysis leads them to conclude that 'very few economic variables are robustly correlated with cross-country growth rates.' But this extreme result may suggest that their analysis sets too high a hurdle for robustness. According to ?, 179, 'If the distribution of the estimators of β µ has some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find one regression for which the estimated coefficient changes signs if enough regressions are run. Thus, giving the label of nonrobust to all variables is all but guaranteed.' This argument is reasonable, so to assess the robustness of empirical results in the literature on democratization, we apply Sala-i-Martin's less stringent test, which involves looking at the entire distribution of parameter estimates to determine the level of confidence in each of the explanatory variables.
? estimates M models of the following form:
where γ is the dependent variable and the subscript j refers to the model or specification, y is a vector of three variables that always appear in the regressions, z is the variable of interest, and x is a vector of up to three variables taken from a pool χ of available variables. He then uses these estimates of the β zj to compute the cumulative distribution function -CDF(0) -the proportion of estimates that are larger or smaller than zero, selecting the largest of the two. The distribution function is computed under two different assumptions: the first aggregation assumes that their distribution across models is normal. The average estimate is computed aŝ ?, 179) . The weights ensure that models with better fit contribute more to the estimate, and the fact that the same number of variables is always included in the regression implies that we do not get 'artificially' better fit by increasing the number of variables. Similarly, ? computes the average variance of the estimates asσ
If the assumption that the β zj are normally distributed holds, the probabilities that β < 0 and β > 0 can be computed fromβ zj andσ 2 z as functions of the average t-ratioβ zĵ σ 2 z as in standard statistical inference. We will refer to the smallest of these two probabilities as the 'average p-value.'
If the assumption of normality does not hold, then Sala-i-Martin computes the aggregate CDF (0) from the individual CDF(0)s as their weighted average,
We make a number of adaptations to ?'s procedure to fit our purpose. First, an obvious difference is that, while Sala-i-Martin applied the method to cross-sectional data with a continuous dependent variable, we follow ? and model the relationship between predictors and the dichotomous dependent variable using the logit-link function of the probability of democracy or non-democracy. We are also using time-series cross-sectional data. Many papers in the quantitative democratization literature treat the data as cross-sectional since they use pooled logit or pooled probit estimators. Thus, we can apply Sala-i-Martin's method directly. Yet the time series in our data may create temporal dependence, which we account for by adding the lagged dependent variable, D t−1 -democracy level the year before t -as one of our y variables.
Another departure from ? and from ? is that we investigate simultaneously transitions from autocracy to democracy and transitions from democracy to autocracy. This is achieved by means of a 'dynamic logit' model (?). 3 This model has democracy/non-democracy as the dependent variable, includes the lagged dependent variable D t−1 , and interaction terms between D t−1 and all explanatory variables. This means that the x variables in equation (4) are pairs of variables -a main term modeling the log odds of democracy at t and an interaction term modeling the log odds of democracy at t given the democracy state at t − 1.
Following Sala-i-Martin, we include the same three y variables in all regressions and refer to them as our 'core' variables. One of these is D t−1 . The two others are the GDP per capita variable and its interaction with D t−1 . As indicated in Section 2, average income, or GDP per capita, has been the most commonly used predictor of democracy since ?. Keeping these three core variables always in the model, we estimate many other models for each of the variables that we include in the pool χ of relevant variables (we explain how we selected variables in the next section).
? estimates each possible combination of three x-variables for each z-variable. We deviate somewhat from this in our treatment of the x-variables. Our data contain several different measures for the same concept variable (the theoretically significant variable). For instance, we can measure education using the illiteracy rate using data from the World Bank, or using secondary school attainment from Barro and Lee (2000) . To avoid including variables that measure the same thing in the same model, we restrict the combination of x-variables to those that measure three different concept variables -not simply different operationalizations of the same concept. If a control is an alternative operationalization of the same concept as the focus variable, this is likely to diminish the effect of the focus variable. This might not be an insurmountable problem if all concepts had the same number of alternative operationalizations since any bias would be roughly equal for each focus variable. However, the number of alternative operationalizations for each concept varies (see next section). Allowing more than one operationalization for each concept then would tend to hurt variables belonging to concepts with many operationalizations. 4
Another difference from ? procedure is that we have to allow for the fact that several variables in our data set have missing data, and the number of missing observations is different for different variables. In Sala-i-Martin's model, parameter estimates are weighted by the model's log-likelihood to ensure that models with better fit to the data are given greater weight. The log-likelihood, however, is dependent on the number of observations that are included in the estimation. Hence, we calculate weights based on the likelihood ratio index (LRI), which is analogous to the R 2 . It is given as
, where LL 0 is the log-likelihood with only the constant term, and LL m is the log-likelihood of the model having just been estimated. This statistic has the advantage that it is less dependent on sample size, and this is important for us as some of our variables are missing observations and sample size varies across models.
The fact that we perform extensive specification tests implies that we do not know the true model. 5 We only know that three variables should be in the model: D t−1 , GDP per capita, and the interaction between GDP per capita and D t−1 . While most scholars would agree that such a model is underspecified, they would disagree over which other variables to add. 6 This is clearly illustrated by the fact that very few existing studies on determinants of democracy utilize similar sets of independent variables. The method that we apply here could help provide some information on what is a better specified regression equation for democratization by testing the fit of several theoretically relevant variables. But it certainly does not replace the need for theorizing about democratization and democratic stability, and the main usefulness of our approach is to give us a sense of the distribution of empirical estimates for all potentially relevant variables.
A concern with our approach is that some of the variables included may be endogenous. We cannot deal with this problem while trying to explore empirically the robustness of different model specifications here, and we assume exogeneity for all variables. To deal with endogeneity, we would have to switch estimators for those models where we suspected endogeneity as a result of the variable combinations in the model. We could not simply use instrumental variables estimation for all models since, if exogeneity cannot be rejected, this would reduce the efficiency of the estimates.
And we could not hope to identify valid instrumental variables for all model specifications. Since quite few of the papers in the literature on democratization deal with endogeneity, we also ignore it and simply try to reduce the risk by lagging independent variables. 7
Finally, there is some concern with how missing data could influence the results of this exercise.
Many of the variables in our data set have missing observations. Some of the variables of interest, such as most income inequality measures, have very limited coverage. Faced with such problems, we have three alternatives. One, we could have added all variables independent of their number of missing observations to the pool of variables used in the analysis. One serious problem with this approach is that we aim to isolate the degree to which individual parameter estimates are sensitive to changes in the model specification. Varying the model specification, however, leads to changes in the sample when variables are missing data for different observations. Two, we could have left out variables with many missing observations, but this has the obvious drawback of excluding substantially interesting explanatory variables. Furthermore, these variables may also be systematically correlated with particular sets of other variables, and leaving some variables out may thus affect the results for the variables included. We opted for the third alternative, namely to utilize multiple imputation in order to generate predictions for missing values. In addition to expanding the number of variables that may be included in the analysis, this procedure mitigates selection biases that could otherwise have been generated if characteristics that affect the probability of missing data are correlated with the dependent variable.
More specifically, we use the multiple imputation techniques for cross sectional -time series data incorporated in the AMELIA II software (see ??). Indeed, ? convincingly argue that listwise deletion of cases is preferable to using the imputation procedure only under a very stringent set of assumptions. Therefore, generating imputed data sets to mitigate various biases is an important operation. The imputation procedure generates predicted values for all missing values on the variables included in the imputation model, and are based on algorithms that take into account the cross sectional -time series structure of the data. We added all the 85 variables used in the analysis below to the imputation model. Following the advice of ?, we also incorporated 41 additional variables to increase the predictive power of the imputation model. We set the minimum and maximum values as bounds for indexes with a specified range and for other restricted variables such as fractions. Furthermore, to increase the precision of the predictions, we set the empirically observed minimum and maximum as bounds for all other variables. The imputation models are computed using a second-order polynomial of time, and the time trends are interacted with the cross section units in order to allow for country-specific trends (see ?).
Data
In order to investigate the determinants of democracy, and how robust these are, we draw on data used in a set of important empirical contributions to the literature. As indicated by the literature review various indicators related to structural economic factors, economic performance, distributional and class-structure indicators, cultural indicators, political-historical indicators, and spatio-temporal transmission indicators are among those that often appear in the literature. As noted in Section 2, we further subdivide the indicators into 15 concept categories. All indicators are listed in Table 1 , sorted according to the concept they belong to, and data sources for the various indicators are also listed.
Results of sensitivity analysis
As noted above, empirical studies have indicated that there may be large differences in the effect of a variable on democratization on the one hand and democratic consolidation on the other. This applies, for instance, to income level (?), and to income inequality (?). Hence, we will present results simultaneously for the main term for each variable and its interaction with lagged democracy.
We analyse the sensitivity to changes in control variable specifications for the 85 variables included in Table 1 , organized by concept category. We cover most countries over the period. We standardized all variables to make estimates easily comparable, and log-transformed many variables to minimize the effect of extreme values. The combinations of 85 variables, following the method presented in Section 4, total about 3.6 million logistic regressions. Table 2 shows the results for the three core variables: GDP per capita, lagged democracy, and their multiplicative interaction.
Over the 3.6 million specifications, the average estimate for β for GDP per capita is -0.015.
These estimates vary considerably, indicating that the estimated effect of average income on probability of democratization is highly contingent on model specification. The largest estimate is 0.841 and the smallest -0.807. The standard deviation ofβ is 0.222. On average, the estimated standard error forβ is 0.131. The standard deviation of the standard error estimates is 0.026. The CDF(0) statistic shows that the estimate is larger than 0 in 48.4% of the specifications, assuming normal distribution of the estimates. The left-most plot in Figure 2 shows the distribution over specifications for the CDF(0) statistic for the GDP per capita variable.
To assess the variable's robustness in terms of statistical significance, the distribution of esti- Figure 3 shows the distribution over specifications of these t-values for the three core variables in the form of histograms. The values (-1.65, 1.65) has been marked with lines -outside the range between these two lines, specifications yield statistically significant results for the variable. The plot for the GDP per capita variable shows that the t-value is between the lines in most specifications, but a sizeable number of specifications yield negative or positive significant results. The distribution for the lagged democracy variable is roughly similar, although a larger proportion of specifications yield t-values larger than 1.65.
The bottom row of Figure 3 shows the distribution of specifications for the GDP per capitalagged democracy interaction. In most of the specifications, the t-values are larger than 1.65. Table   2 shows that the average t-value is 3.756. Hence, we find relatively robust support for the hypothesis that income level enhances democratic stability.
The results for the three core variables shows that the interaction between lagged democracy and GDP per capita is positive and significant, whereas the estimates for the main terms are not clearly different from 0. These results are in line with ? and ? who found that GDP per capita increases the probability of sustaining democracy, but not of transition into democracy. Table 3 summarizes the average statistics for the main terms for the 85 variables in the study. Main term coefficients are interpreted as the change in log odds of democracy at t for observations that were non-democratic at t − 1, i.e. log odds of democratization.
Other variables
More than half of the variables included in our analysis are robustly associated with a change in log odds of democratization. Quite a few of the political and institutional explanatory variables are for example robust: Most of the 'regime type' variables (concept 13) are robust (perhaps reflecting a certain degree of tautology in this context). In general, regime types that are partly democratic are more likely to democratize than regime types that are more consistent. This is seen in the finding that limited multi-party and multi-party autocratic regimes (multilim and HTreg4) are robustly positive, as are the presidential and mixed system variables (DDregime3 and DDregime2) 8 . This fits nicely with the results in ?, who found that "the majority of transitions from nondominant-party (that is, more competitive) limited multiparty regimes result in democracy" (p. Another concept with robust estimates is that of education (concept 1). Five of the six education measures are robustly positive -education has a positive effect on the probability of democratization over and beyond that of GDP per capita (which, as a core variable, is controlled for in all specifications). Only Banks' primary school indicator (school02) is not robust despite the fact that the WDI indicator for the same is (wdi schprim). All three 'health' variables (concept 5) are also robust. Controlling for GDP per capita, low infant mortality rates ( Table 4 summarizes the average statistics for the interaction terms between the 85 variables and the lagged democracy variable. These coefficients are interpreted as the change in log odds of democracy at t for observations that were democratic at t − 1, i.e. log odds of continued democracy or democratic stability.
Considerably fewer of the interaction coefficients are robust. However, several regime type indicators are robust also when it comes to affecting democratic stability, e.g. those indicating 'limited multi-party regimes' or 'multiparty autocracies' (multilim, HTreg4). Furthermore, we find that presidential, and mixed democracies (DDregime2, DDregime3) have consistent negative signs.
The latter results provide support for the hypothesis proposed by ? that parliamentary regimes are generally more stable than presidential. Additionally, the results are also barely negatively robust for regimes that succeeded military autocracies (prevmil), indicating the destabilizing effect of military intervention in politics (see ?). Moreover, the 'political stability' indicators are robust (concept 11). As for autocracies, government crises, riots, and anti-government demonstrations (domestic4, domestic6, domestic8) increase the risk of regime type change -they are robustly negative. Also as for autocracies, stability indicators such as the age of the regime (agereg, durable) and the tenure of the current executive (tenure) increase the probability of continued democracy (see also, e.g. ?). Among the 'institutional characteristics' indicators (concept 10), the 'unitary democracy' (sch unit) and corruption (icrgCorruption) indicators are robust, and the rule-of-law indicator (icrg qoc) borderline so, all with positive signs.
As for autocratic stability, GDP growth increases the probability of democratic continuation (wdi gdpgr) (see also, e.g. ?). However, none of the other 'economic performance' indicators (concept 6) are robust. In contrast with the results in ?, we do not income inequality, as measured by wageshare, to be a robust determinant of democratic stability. Two of the education variables (concept 1) are robust: percentage literate and secondary school enrollment (school12, school04).
Puzzlingly, however, they have robustly negative estimates, indicating that education reduces the stability of democracy. Above, we found that most education indicators were robust determinants for democratization. When combined with the latter result, this may provide an additional "explanation", in addition to those of country-specific effects, for the lacking effect of education on level of democracy found in ?. Three 'resource curse' variables (concept 3) are robust, but with a sign that questions the cursed nature of rent-generating resources. All three robust variables (wdi oil, wdi resource, fl oil) have positive signs. Hence, natural-resource income stabilizes not only dictatorships, but also democracies. In contrast with the results for democratization only one of the 'modernization' indicators are robust determinants of democratic stability, namely the radios per capita indicator (media2), with a positive sign.
One of the 'colonial heritage' indicators (concept 9) is robust -the residual category 'other colonial powers', i.e. those that are neither French, Spanish, Portuguese or British/American, with a positive sign. Hence, our analysis indicates that British colonial history is neither a robust determinant of democratization, nor of democratic stability. This is perhaps surprising, given that much of the political science literature has attributed a democracy-enhancing role to inheriting British institutions and political culture (see e.g. ?). Furthermore, only one of the time dummy variables (concept 15) is robust: Ceteris paribus, democratic stability was lower in the 1990s than in other periods.
In Figures 4-6 we plot the distribution of t-statistics over specifications for each of the 85 variables. The plots are sorted by concept and show estimates for main terms ("type a") to the left and estimates for interaction terms ("type d") to the right. These figures display visually the same information as in Table 3 and 4.
In Figure 4 , it is clear that most operationalizations of education are robustly positive as main terms (most of the distribution lies to the right of the (-1.65, 1.65) interval), but that they are much closer to zero as interaction terms. Our operationalization of country size (concept 2) is not clearly distinguishable from 0 in either form. The figures for concept 3 -the resource curse -show how robust these variables are, and those for concept 4 -modernization -that these variables are rarely very different from zero. Most distributions are quite close to normal distributions. The estimates In Figure 5 , we see that the health indicators (concept 5) are robustly associated with democratization but not with the stability of democracy, and that growth in GDP per capita is the only economic performance variable that is robustly different from zero. Among the 'ethnicity and religion' variables, only the muslim share is robustly different from zero as main terms, and none are as interaction terms. The figure shows clearly how robust the 'former spanish colony' is as a main term in the models. Several interesting results emerge from the sensitivity analysis. For example on the much debated relationship between GDP per capita and democracy, we corroborate the results in ? and
? that GDP per capita reduces the probability of transition from democracy to non-democracy, but does not clearly affect the probability of democratization. Furthermore, we find that various health and education indicators have a robust relationship with probability of democratization, but surprisingly do not seem to contribute to democratic stability.
We also find robust relationships between several concept operationalizations and the probability of transition between democracy and non-democracy, in both directions. As in ?, indicators that identify institutions that fall between consistent democracy or consistent autocracy are associated with a high probability of democratization and of autocratization. Several measures of political stability are also robustly associated with both types of transition -stabilities predicts non-transition well, as one would expect. Economic growth also stabilizes both regime types. We also find 'resource curse' variables, and oil in particular, to reduce the risk of transitions in both directions.
Several variables have no robust relationship with either democratization nor autocratization.
For example, we do not find any robust relationship with British colonial history. Neither do we find any significant relationship with income inequality. Furthermore, only one of our ethnicity and religion variable is robust: The share of the population that is muslim is a robust negative predictor of democratization. It is not a robust predictor of change from democracy toward non-democracy, however, and this result may be more due to historical contingencies than to a real effect of a particular religion.
